Introduction
It is encouraging to note that questions about the 'relevance' of social sciences, sociology, history and philosophy of medicine to medical science and practice do not resound merely in departments of social medicine and medical humanities. Methodological and conceptual trends in health care studies--such as the increase of longitudinal approaches, and greater sensitivity to multicausality and the complexity of life trajectories-are but a few indicators of the impact of social science on health care research. 1 The attention of medical practitioners today is increasingly drawn to important ideas that derive from debates in medical humanities research, such as the notion of relativism and the advantages and disadvantages of relativist perspectives, or the concept of 'network' and the relevance for health care workers of focusing on interest groups to better understand the course of scientific research and practice. And so it is that an increasing number of medical authors are embracing recent insights in the history, philosophy, sociology and anthropology of medicine.
Indeed, many contemporary studies in the social sciences and medical humanities have raised our awareness of the extent to which medical practices and interpretations are socially embedded, locally varied and historically contingent. Many such studies make us acknowledge that the field of medicine is both deeply entrenched in the social world, and is a social and cultural system itself. Yet the key question remains: how best to describe the fine relationships that make up medicine, conceived as a social and cultural system? Many authors maintain that a clear answer to this question is more likely to come from studies in the medical humanities than by turning to research in the (medical) natural sciences. However, although we welcome critical interest in situating medicine socially, we wonder whether the types of questioning that silently continue to presume an in principle divide between medical humanities and natural sciences should be those we ought to carry over into the 21st century. A growing number of scholars who care about the future of medicine as a social and cultural system feel that the semantic division into 'the humanistic' and 'natural scientific' in medicine is counter-productive. It does not foster more sensitive forms of medical self-description, and hampers the development of finer-tuned conceptual tools for medical action and self-evaluation.
The Historical Distinction Between Natural and Human Sciences: Divisions of Labour, Territory and Language
The distinction between (medical) humanities and (medical) natural sciences represents a relatively recent historical construct. Over the past four centuries the world of universal scientia has undergone a complex transformation, which has generated particular divisions of territory and institutions, labour and language. In the broadest sense this separation can be cast as a division between Geisteswissenschaflen and Naturwissenschaflen. This distinction was institutionally consolidated in the course of the 19th century, albeit against considerable opposition.
Throughout, the complex process of 'creating the divide between natural sciences and humanities' was accompanied'by many expressions of concern over its practical implications and deeper significance. Critics worried about the various forms of knowledge-production which were being favoured at the expense of others, and about the medical/scientific practices which were propagated as others were marginalised. In the medical domain a sequence of ideological and practical objections was mounted to resist what some feared to be the total subordination of medicine to the methodological requirements and ideological claims of the natural sciences. Many observers honoured medicine with the title 'modern science par excellence', by which they meant that medicine was the only true domain of '... a sequence of ideological and practical objections was mounted to resist the total subordination of medicine to the methods and ideology of natural science" scientia left. These authors maintained that largely due to its very subject matter: the patient, medicine had managed to continue to be a rich and integrated scientific realm of study and practice in which 'humanities' issues and problems of 'natural sciences', and issues of cognition, practical action and moral evaluation had remained inextricably linked. It was argued that given its core subjects of attention, medicine neither could nor should succumb to the 'two-worlds' imperative (the urge to divide the world of science into that of natural sciences and that of humanities, with all the language divisions this entails). Such counterclaims notwithstanding, the public image of 'medicine as a natural science' had many powerful advocates. They strove to further modern medicine as 'biomedicine', based on the conviction that processes in human life answered universal laws of nature which could be uncovered by good (i.e. experimental) research. Phenomena were supposed to be explicable in materialist structural terms. Knowledge could and would expand in a progressive manner and many problems could and would be (technically) fixed. But even in the face of the increasingly strong public representation of medicine as biomedicine, critical questions concerning the precise relationship between various discourses related to medicine continued to surface and resurface. One of the main reasons for the persistence of these questions lies--it seems to us--in the very composition of modern medicine as a self-organising and self-referential system. In such systems the issue of systematic self-reflection never wears out: being dynamic systems there is an in-built necessity to reflect upon oneself in order to perform the task of managing particular systematic insecurities. The patient will always be an influence in generating these insecurities. As systemtheoreticians teach us, the self-referential, selforganising system will always continue to generate discussion about the best sites for these self-reflections. Similarly, it will continue to address the basic systematic need for assessing and reassessing the most appropriate terms in which such systematic self-reflection should be carried out in order to produce vital descriptions of the system.
If we consider medicine and its sub-systems to be such complex self-organising, self-referential systems, certain questions automatically follow. In order to compose the necessary vital descriptions of itself, the system must address--in the richest possible detail--a range of questions concerning the elements it consists of. It must clarify which crucial interactions and communications exist within the system. It must explicate what the system as a system actually 'produces', and through what kinds of relationships of production. Furthermore it must ask, what are the systematic aims of production: producing 'facts', 'values', 'aetiologies', 'cures' or all of these things in different combinations? In order to assess such matters with some degree of sensitivity one would have to be clear about the relationships which are expressed between the system and its environment and between the systematic forms of self-representation which the system designs for itself and its Umwelt. In this phase of self-assessment, the issues of 'goals and purposes' and 'processes of self-reproduction' automatically and inevitably occur, issues which concur with the dynamic processes of systematic ordering. Since self-referential systems are in principle dynamic entities, certain key questions concerning 'change over time' would also have to be added to all the above-mentioned issues. Observing medical systems through the more abstract looking glass of system-theoreticians, we quickly notice that clinging too rigidly to sharp divisions into language domains labelled as 'the natural scientific' and "the humanistic' hinder medical self-description.
Beyond the 'Two-Worlds' Perspective: The Convergence of Action/Reflection Studies in Medicine
For many years one simplified way to cast the division of labour in medicine was by allocating problems concerning clinical and research activities and procedures to the natural sciences, while allocating those of reflection to the humanities. In the decades after the Second World War this basic dichotomy was modified by the introduction of certain new types of evaluation. The term 'health care analysis' was first introduced to describe a set of internal, sub-systemic performance analyses, which mostly gave answers to particular policy problems, drawing on the rapidly developing intrasystemic jargons of epidemiology, health care economics, health management and 'quality assessment'. Little need was felt to engage in the vastly more complex task of considering the heterogeneous system of medicine as a whole, or of providing some necessary conceptual buildingblocks for such system-descriptions. Until very recently most critics of medicine would shy away from the huge task of articulating what this larger systemic self-reflection might entail, and thus left the question of what reflective language could be developed to describe medicine in its current complexity largely unresolved.
The Search for Full Systom-Doscr/ptlons
Nonetheless, in various corners of the medical field there are signs of a growing eagerness to engage once again in the titanic search for full system-descriptions. Several strands feed into this drive. To the more traditional, yet laudable, efforts to "build bridges across the "two-worlds" divide', often by merely pointing out the importance of 'social or cultural factors for medicine', new efforts seem to herald a more revolutionary shift. Heterogeneous and disparate as they may still seem, these efforts are united by the wish to move beyond established dichotomies, such as those between subjective and objective, fact and value. The efforts are rooted in an interesting convergence of practices. Scholars who a few decades ago would work in isolation from each other, as if on different planets, now engage in redescriptions of medical practice which carry great potential for future innovative and integrative system-concepts. If our diagnosis of the present avant-garde efforts in 'reflective activity' is correct, we might--at least in the domain of critical reflection on medicine--even be moving towards a dissolution of the "two-worlds' divide.
'... we might even be moving towards a dissolution of the "two-worlds" divide"
Let us briefly point out two important trends that seem to support this view. Firstly, one can observe a widespread scholarly interest in medical and scientific practice. Across the fields of history, sociology, philosophy, ethics, and the anthropology of science and medicine, scholars are turning towards a study of the dynamics of practical work. Slowly, but steadily, the concepts of practice that emerge in these circles are finding their way into debates current in the heartland of clinical medicine, those which concern the improvement of practice and quality of care. Secondly, within certain ~nardcore' biomedical sciences, such as immunology, but even more notably in the cognitive sciences, it is possible to detect a quickly growing interest in organismic re-descriptions of the subject matter of these fields (multiple references to cultural, philosophical and even religious awarenesses form an integral part of this re-written story).
The first trend, that of the reflective turn towards practice, is easiest to locate. It can be viewed as a third phase in the development of social constructivist perspectives on medicine and science, in keeping with a renewed interest in the moral dimension of medicine and science. From around 1970 the theoretical vanguard of sociologists and philosophers of science has been engaged in a fundamental re-examination of the acclaimed relationships between social-cultural influences and the formulation of scientific knowledge. The first phase of this constructivist programme carried a clear political agenda. The main aim seemed to be to develop a critique of professionalism and professional autonomy, and to criticise earlier reflections on medicine and science which took insufficient account of the social influences on the production of scientific knowledge. The socalled 'strong programme' of social constructivista, developed during this first phase (primarily by Edinburgh scholars such as S. Shapin, S. Schafer, D. Bloor and B. Barnes) advocated the research of scientific and medical knowledge in terms of economic interests and macro-social and political forces: the result was a critical vocabulary shift from 'intellectual development' (located in the realm of ideas) to 'knowledge-production' (firmly located in a socio-economic domain). Rather than declaring scientific knowledge to be subject to progress in its own purely intellectual realm, these scholars maintained that it arose in a complex production-process, open to social and economic analysis. Scientific communities were recast as communities of interest. In general, less attention was given to the contents of knowledge and the individual motivation of scientists than to the larger processes of the construction and dissemination of knowledge.
This first phase of social constructivism encountered considerable internal and external criticism. Critics expressed their fear that social constructivism would fall prey to gross forms of macro-sociological reductionism. By and large, writers such as Bloor and Barnes retained a clear distinction between cognitive and social elements in the development of medical and scientific knowledge, and between active and reflective factors and disciplines. In response, some sociologists of science began to promote a methodological modification which addressed the question: how precisely do social factors relate to cognitive developments in science? in more detail.
Sociologists and philosophers opened up this issue while using ethnographic methods adopted from anthropologists. Their work brought 'reflective' scholars into closer contact with the activities of scientists, whom they 'followed around" in laboratories and clinics. Within this second phase of social constructivist research some new concepts of space in science and medicine were worked out, together with several new reflections on the dynamics of the laboratory and the hospital. In their treatment of medical and scientific spaces, scholars gave much closer attention to the techniques, machines and other objects that populate these spaces and often dominate the practices carried out in these institutions. So-called 'thick descriptions' of the various scientific and practical sites also began to include references to how these settings 'insulate' themselves, or to what boundaries were drawn between these sites and the outside world.
A further step taken during the 1980s towards connecting the social and the cognitive elements in science and medicine more systematically was the development of network-analyses. In these analyses scientific production was conceived of as taking place in dynamic networks of human and non-human actors whose means of operating could be examined over time. Authors such as B. Latour argued that both entities were 'constructs'. 'Facts" in these dynamic networks would always be co-produced with 'their legitimations'.
In the 1990s
In the mid-1990s we appear to be in yet another phase of social constructivism. The major and characterising shift has been from a primary focus on science as knowledge to science as practice. 2 The more scholars joined the earlier movements to pay closer attention to the practical dynamics of medicine and science, the more they began to realise that scientific culture 'is made up of all sorts of bits and pieces--material, social and conceptual--that stand in no necessary unitary relation to one another ...'. While attempting to do justice to the changing phenomenology of the practices of medicine and science, the authors sharpened their awareness of how 'disparate and distinguishable cultural elements' figure dynamically in these practices. 2 In providing re-descriptions of scientific and medical practice which do justice to this awareness, such authors aim at breaking down the traditional boundaries between 'science' and 'culture', indeed between 'natural scientific' and 'humanistic' terminologies, often in self-conscious attempts to study the historical reasons for the divide. 3 What emerges is a vocabulary designed to do justice to the mixed functions that men and objects perform in medicine and science--to the hybrid status men and objects have in the often highly artificial scenes that make up modem medicine and science. It is often in order to communicate these new awarenesses to others, that one can begin to observe some scholarly attempts to integrate these narratives into a more systematic revisionist account of science and medicine at large. 4
Effects on Practitioners
To the practising physician, the above-mentioned trends towards fundamental re-descriptions of medical practice may seem high flying, or even somewhat gratuitous theoretical exercises with little relevance for day-to-day practice. Practitioners feel under pressure to make quick decisions, in which conventional terminologies function and communicate far more safely. What need--they may wonder--is there for a revision of medical self-description and selfreflection as radical as that suggested above?
"... simple dichotomies which derive from the old "'two-worlds" divide no longer hold"
We believe that given the phenomenological shifts within medicine and science during this century, and especially given the massive entree of technology into medicine, an adjustment of systematic self-redescription is long overdue, and--given the systemic nature of medicine--fortunately also inevitable. In certain core areas of medical research scholars seem to share this view. And here we come finally to the second development we wish to mention: that taking place within certain 'hardcore' biomedical sciences. For instance, amongst second-generation immunological researchers since the 1970s a shift in language is discernible away from the 19th century 'war' vocabulary of 'attack and defence' towards a language in which 'self'-expression is the key metaphor. Practically speaking, this entails a re-introduction of the subjective into immunological theorising. But perhaps even more clearly the urge amongst certain medical researchers to move beyond the division between the natural scientific and the humanistic expresses itself in recent work in the cognitive sciences. Traditional ways of distinguishing 9 experience" from 'cognition', or "internal biological organisation' from 'the outside world' are being abandoned, with linguists, philosophers, neurologists and cognitive psychologists striking new forms of cooperation. 5 Even while in-depth studies of these very recent and exciting transformations are still largely lacking, one can take the fact that amongst the world's leading neuroscientists there is an explicit search for developing'a sense of common ground between mind in science and mind in experience' in notions of' the embodied mind', as yet another crucial indication that simple dichotomies which derive from the old 'twoworlds' divide no longer hold. By and large practitioners look for what they have come to distinguish through years of vocational training, practical work with patients, and processes of peer and societal review. How systems as complex as the medical or scientific ones change their direction and self-description is not easily explained. But if some of the work referred to above will spill over into the medical and scientific curricula, it may at least move students beyond the 'two-worlds' divide. There, we are sure, an exciting new universe of critical self-description of practice awaits them--one in which crucial questions concerning elements of practice today might be given the space not offered to them at present. Questions concerning the precise roles of objects and instruments, and the 'morality' of technology are but two categories that come to mind. 6
